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Abstract 
 
Although the growing importance of workers’ remittance in international capital flow is 
indubitable, it is apparent that some countries can take full advantage from this cash flow 
while the others cannot attain any significant benefit from it. Financial development, 
which may facilitate the conversion of workers’ remittance into a productive investment 
and thereby economic growth, can be considered to be one of the influential factors. 
However, there is no consensus in existing literature about the impact of workers’ 
remittance on economic growth in the presence of financial development. This study 
therefore examines whether financial development catalyses the transmission channel 
from workers’ remittance to economic growth. The system GMM and the fixed effects 
estimators are used for panel data analysis. Our analysis indicates that methods matter in 
studying the effect of workers’ remittance and financial development on growth. 
Estimates based on system GMM indicate that the workers’ remittance through financial 
development significantly accelerate economic growth. We also find that in the face of 
financial liberalization and trade openness the workers’ remittance significantly fosters 
economic growth.    
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1. Introduction  
 
Workers’ remittances, defined broadly as money sent by migrant workers to their country 
of origin, have increased rapidly from around 36 billion US dollars in 1980 to 68 billion 
in 1990, 130 billion in 2000, and over 440 billion in 2010. From the mid-1990s onward, 
developing countries started becoming larger and larger as recipients of workers’ 
remittance. The process gained its momentum in the 2000s. In 1990, developing countries 
received about 30 billion compared to 37 billion US dollars received by developed 
countries. At the end of the 1990s, while developing counties received about 3 times 
more remittance than what they received in the early-1990s, developed countries received 
only less than 1.5 times. At the end of the 2000s, developing countries have received 
about 3 times more remittance than developed countries. Subsequently, although a large 
sum of workers’ remittance is transmitted within developed countries themselves, 
however, we do not deal with the implications of such North-North transfers. 
 Currently, among developing countries middle-income countries are the largest 
recipient of workers remittance, followed by lower middle-income, higher middle-income 
and low-income countries (see, Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Remittance inflows 1980-2010 (US$ Million). 
 
Data Source: Migration and remittance, the World Bank, November 2010
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 Data on remittances are available at www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances 
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The World Bank estimated that in 2010 the total value of remittance globally 
received by developing countries was $325 billion, more than three times that of foreign 
aid. It is believed that such remittances have become the second largest source of external 
finance for developing countries, second only to foreign direct investment (FDI) and far 
exceeding bank transfers and equity investment, both in absolute term and as a proportion 
of GDP (Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt and Peria, 2006; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). 
One of the attractions of workers’ remittances is that unlike private capital flows, they are 
less subject to cyclical fluctuations and tend to be stable without being affected by 
economic slumps in richer countries where most all LDC migrants work. The resilience 
of remittance is potentially due to consumption smoothing; when negative income shocks 
occur migrant workers still continue to send their savings home because they believe that 
their families at home need it for their own consumption. In addition, the World Bank 
identifies the ‘home bias’ factor where returning migrants often repatriate their whole 
savings to their home country.  
During the last global financial crisis, remittances fell by only 5% between 2008 
and 2009, while FDI fell by over 40% and other private financing such as debt and 
foreign equity investment fell by over 46% during the same period. Although there are 
concerns regarding the so-called phenomenon of the ‘Dutch disease’, some studies have 
shown that foreign capital (including remittances) may not have a serious adverse effect 
on competitiveness (see, for example, Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). However, 
this hypothesis is debatable and needs further empirical testing.  
Remittances could potentially have huge developmental impact on the recipient 
country’s economy. Not only could they add to domestic investment, but also by creating 
effective demand raise the rate of growth by utilising excess capacity of capital and 
underemployment of labour – both endemic in developing countries..  
There is now considerable attention from both academic and policy circles to 
examine the impact of migrant workers’ remittances on economic growth and 
development. However, results of those studies are mixed; while some studies (for 
example, Stark and Lucas, 1988; Taylor, 1992; and Faini, 2002) indicate that there is a 
positive relationship between remittances and economic growth, other studies (such as 
Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah, 2003; IMF, 2005) report a negative relationship. 
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Moreover, a few studies examine what happens to the effect of workers remittance on 
economic growth if financial development plays a catalytic role. Those studies also do 
not provide uniform results. For example, using developing countries’ data for the period 
1975-2002, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) find that remittances boost growth in 
countries with less developed financial systems. The study indicates that a weak domestic 
or local financial sector increases the productivity of workers remittance since the latter 
may be the only or major conduit of foreign capital as well as a major supplementary 
source for total aggregate capital stock in the economy. On the contrary, Ahamada and 
Coulibaly (2011) find that a high level of financial development helps remittances to have 
a high stabilizing impact. They use developing and emerging countries’ data for the 
period 1980-2008. 
We therefore examine whether financial development catalyses the transmission 
channel from workers remittance to economic growth. Moreover, we examine whether 
the estimated results remain unchanged when financial liberalization and trade openness 
are taken into account. We know that FDI is the largest source of external finance for 
developing countries. We therefore compare the effect of FDI with the effect of workers’ 
remittance on economic growth. The study uses data over the period 1980-2009.    
It is expected in our study that financial development would speed up workers’ 
remittance to be translated into economic growth. The greater the width and depth of 
financial development, the more it creates positive externalities to the impact of 
remittance on growth. First, more remittance would be channelled towards productive 
investment, rather than conspicuous consumption, if the financial sector was ready to 
absorb the funds sent by migrant workers home. Instead of ‘wasting’ the extra income 
received by recipients in developing countries, they would be incentivised by financial 
institutions offering higher returns. Second, recipients of foreign income would access 
financial institutions simply to collect their revenue streams but in the process they could 
demand other financial services as their knowledge and trust increase. Third, banks will 
be able to resolve their asymmetric information problems (between customers and banks) 
by increasing the knowledge of new customers who have access to foreign incomes sent 
by relatives and friends working abroad. Fourth, banks will be able to increase their 
overall lending based on new deposits created via remittance and these financial 
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multipliers will increase the supply of loanable funds to the rest of the economy. Fifth, 
remittances are often lumpy and recipients might wish to utilise ‘financial products that 
allow for the safe storage of these funds’ (Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt and Peria, 2006. 
p3); this allows for the growth of new and innovative financial products even when the 
original remittances were not received through normal commercial channels. Sixth, the 
risks associated with such transfers via the curb market (common to many poor 
developing countries and regions) is eliminated with higher quality of financial services 
accessible to senders and recipients alike. This could potentially increase the total supply 
of such transfers. 
An important complementary factor, which may have an independent effect on 
development, is financial liberalization per se. With a more liberalized financial sector, 
workers’ remittance may find an easier access to investible sectors rather than spending 
on conspicuous consumption. Traditional and poorer societies have numerous 
sociological reasons for one-off spending on large consumption projects (marriages for 
example) and these tendencies are exacerbated by the lack of a liberalized and accessible 
financial sector where investment can easily take place. It is worth noting that workers’ 
remittances are often intra-family transfers and their impact would be different from 
corporate transfers such as FDI by multinational corporations. Hence, ease of investment, 
as pre-supposed in the financial liberalization literature, would increase the rate of 
growth. We use financial liberalization as an independent control variable in our 
estimation. We also examine whether workers remittance can foster economic growth in 
the presence of financial liberalization.  
Trade openness may increase export demand which generates investment 
opportunity in exporting industries. We therefore examine whether workers’ remittance 
accelerates economic growth if trade liberalization increases.  
Section 2 gives a brief literature survey, Section 3 discusses the data and the 
structure of empirical model, Section 4 provides the empirical results and policy 
implications, and Section 5 concludes briefly. 
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2. The Literature 
 
Remittance flow has grown faster over past three decades most of which has been 
flowing to developing economics particularly middle income countries. Similarly there is 
a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature which examine whether workers’ 
remittance positively affects economic growth and whether financial development plays 
any significant role in the growth process. Existing literature produced highly mixed 
results. A group of studies suggest a positive effect of workers’ remittance on economic 
growth through higher consumption, savings and investment. For example, Aggarwal, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Peria (2011), assuming the hypothesis that financial development 
enhances economic growth, find that remittance inflow promotes financial sector 
development in developing countries. Similarly, Catrinescu, Leon-Ledesma, Piracha, and 
Quillin (2006) reject the existence of negative effect of remittance inflow on long-run 
economic growth. However, Rao and Hassan (2011) find that remittance has no direct 
effect but small indirect effect on economic growth. 
Second group of studies find a negative impact of workers’ remittance on 
economic growth. These studies indicate that workers’ remittance appreciates real 
exchange rate and reduces international competitiveness (i.e, Dutch Disease). It also 
reduces workers’ participation in the labour market. Lopez, Molina, and Bussolo (2007) 
and Chowdhury and Rabbi (2014), for instance, suggest that remittance inflow 
significantly appreciates real exchange rate of recipient country, which ultimately reduces 
international competitiveness in export sector. Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah (2005) also 
develop and test a model which indicates that remittance is a non-profit driven 
compensatory transfer and therefore has a negative correlation with economic growth. 
Barajas, Chami, Fullenkamp, Gapen, and Montiel (2009) suggest that although 
remittance has an undeniable effect on poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing, it 
does not significantly affect economic growth.    
Third bunch of literature estimate the relationship between remittance inflow and 
financial development. Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt and Pería (2011) find a positive 
association between remittance flow and financial development. Chowdhury (2011) 
suggests that there is a positive relationship between remittance inflow and financial 
development; however, the reverse causation is absent in Bangladesh data.    
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There is yet fourth group of research which examines the role of workers’ 
remittance in investment, productivity, employment and import. For instance, Lucas 
(2005) and Glytsos (2002) show that remittance inflow accelerates investment. Leon-
Ledesma and Piracha (2004) show that workers’ remittance increases productivity and 
employment through investment. Roberts and Banaian (2004) shows that average 
propensity to save from remittance is 40 percent. Glytsos (2002) states that remittance 
acts as a source of financing for imports and decreases the balance of payments deficit in 
LDCs. On the contrary, Russell (1986) indicates that remittance increases imports and 
widen balance of payments deficit.  
A further group of research estimates impact of workers’ remittance on economic 
growth through institutional development. Catrinescu, Leon-Ledesma, Piracha, and 
Quillin (2006) suggest that a sound institutional environment enhance efficiency of 
investment leading to higher output. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) find that workers’ 
remittance positively affects economic growth however in less financially developed 
countries. On the contrary, Ahamada and Coulibaly (2011) find that although the effect of 
financial development varies across country, a high level of financial development helps 
remittances to have a high stabilizing effect on GDP growth.  
Hence, there is still considerable debate on the effect of remittances inflow on 
macroeconomic variables. Kireyev (2006), perhaps, correctly argues that the impact of 
remittance depends on the structural characteristics such as consumption and investment 
patterns as well as the capacity to manage large financial inflows of the recipient country. 
Our study therefore investigates whether financial structure of countries assists 
remittance in influencing economic growth. 
 
3. Data, Model Specification and Method 
 
The study applies annual unbalanced panel data for 72 countries over the 1980-
2009 period. However, when all variables are included the data for 54-56 countries are 
found valid in different empirical models. The valid sample size in different models is 
between 342 and 422.  
Data for GDP growth rate, the ratio of workers’ remittance to GDP 
(remittance/GDP), the ratio of FDI to GDP (FDI/GDP), exports of high-tech 
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manufactured goods (Tec) are collected from world development indicators of World 
Bank (see, ANNEX 1). Data for the sum of government collective and government 
individual consumption expenditure (Gov), and openness are collected from Penn World 
Table (PWT). Data for financial liberalization comes from Bekaet, Harvey and Lundblad 
(2005) and data for financial development indicators are collected from Beck, Démirguc-
Kunt and Levine (2009). Descriptive statistics for the variables are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Countries Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP Growth Rate 1982 72 3.211 3.892 -19.01 27.46 
Remittance/GDP 1855 69 2.592 4.116 0.0001 28.692 
Inv 2022 72 21.513 10.406 -18.864 60.475 
Gov 2022 72 7.80e+12 3.06e+13 4.60e+08 2.20e+14 
Tec 1825 65 14.81 14.71 0.01 74.95 
FDI/GDP 1411 71 19.31 2.322 10.60 25.80 
Openness 2022 72 67.107 47.248 10.316 426.723 
Financial Liberalization 
a
  2088 72 0.614 0.486 0 1 
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Cagdp 1548 72 -2.369 6.012 -42.89 23.17 
Bdgdp 1446 72 0.457 0.317 0.0452 2.301 
Pcrdbgdp 1441 72 0.469 0.367 0.0140 2.006 
Llgdp 1440 72 0.530 0.325 0.0691 2.422 
Fdgdp 1446 72 0.478 0.328 0.045 2.301 
a 
Financial liberalization is a dummy variable; where the value in liberalization period is one (1) otherwise 
zero (0). 
 
Sierra Leone was found as the most volatile economy in terms of economic 
growth rate. The growth rate of Sierra Leone in 1992 was as low as -19.01 percent and in 
2002 it was as high as 27.46 percent. In this study we have used five standard financial 
development indicators namely Current Account Balance to GDP (CAGDP), Bank 
Deposits to GDP (BDGDP),  Private Credit by Deposit Money in Banks to GDP 
(PCRDBGDP), Liquid Liabilities to GDP (LLGDP) and Financial System Deposits to 
GDP (FDGDP) (see, ANNEX 2). CAGDP shows negative mean value and negative 
minimum values because the current account of many countries is negative. Financial 
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liberalization is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if financial regime remains 
liberalized and 0 otherwise (see, ANNEX 4). 
The most significant financial development indicator is picked to use in our step-
wise regression. We first estimate our empirical model using full-sample without 
introducing the financial development variables. The study then introduces the financial 
development variables in empirical model. We then test standard financial development 
variables suggested by existing literature (see, ANNEX 2). Our study mainly focuses on 
the impact of remittance, financial development, the cross-product of remittance and 
financial development, and finally the cross product of remittance and financial 
liberalization variables.      
Our main hypothesis is that the existence of financial development (FD) will 
enhance the (positive) impact of workers remittance (WR) on economic growth (EG). 
Since financial liberalisation (FL) may have independent effects on economic growth, 
irrespective of the quality of financial development, we use it as a separate independent 
variable. Moreover, we have tested whether workers’ remittance affects the economic 
growth differently during the period when financial sector remains liberalized. We also 
examine whether workers’ remittance positively affects economic growth when trade 
openness (OPEN) exists in the country. The basic empirical model is the following: 
 
EG =  + (WR) +  (FD) +  (WR).(FD) + FL + (WR).(FL) + OPEN +  
(WR).(OEPN) +  (Z)         (1) 
 
If  and  are both positive, then we can estimate (in the long-run): 
 
EG/WR =  +  (FD) >  
Alternatively, if  is negative, we could contemplate a situation where workers 
remittance has lowered impact for economies with high levels of financial development. 
Essentially, we are asking whether workers’ remittances are substitutes or complements 
to local financial development with either a re-enforcing positive cycle of growth 
enhancement or a negative impact where one source of finance replaces the other. 
Overall, therefore, we empirically test the impact of workers remittance on economic 
growth (or levels of economic development) in the presence or absence of financial 
development. We analyse the impact of such inflows when the recipient country has 
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undergone some financial development. The third situation arises when  appears to be 
an insignificant coefficient. This would then indicate that financial development does not 
have anything to do with the causal link between workers’ remittance and economic 
growth.    
Similarly, if  and  both are positive, then we can estimate  
EG/WR =  +  (FL) >  
If  and  both are positive, then we can estimate  
EG/WR =  +  (OEPN) > .  
Z stands for a group of control variables which includes private investment (Inv), 
government expenditure (Gov), technology improvement (Tec), and foreign direct 
investment (FDI/GDP). 
 
Some existing studies (e.g. Catrinescu et al., 2009) on workers’ remittance have 
used cross-section regression analysis whilst others (e.g. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 
2009) have employed panel data methods to estimate the relationship between workers’ 
remittance and economic growth. Since panel study offers the opportunity to use time 
dimension, it can be regarded as superior to cross-sectional estimate. This study applies 
the panel data analysis approach. Since the data for all variables are not available for full-
sample period, we used an unbalanced panel approach. The Least Square Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) approach is inconsistent for dynamic panel data with individual effects 
irrespective of whether we use fixed or random effects specification (Nickell, 1981). In 
this context, GMM approach is more appropriate (Arenallo and Bond, 1985). However, 
we apply both LSDV as well as the System Generalized Method of Moment (SGMM) 
estimator to examine the consistency in findings. Empirical results are reported and 
discussed below. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
We plot countries’ average economic growth rates (for full-sample) against their 
average ratios of workers remittance to GDP in Figure 2. The trend line shows a positive 
relationship between workers’ remittance and economic growth.  
 
Figure 2: Workers’ Remittance and Economic Growth (1980-2010). 
 
 
 
Financial Development Indicators 
We subsequently test the financial development indicators in economic growth 
regression (see Table 2). Our study use five different financial indicators suggested by 
Beck and Démirguc-Kunt (2009) (see, ANNEX 3) which are Liquid Liabilities to GDP 
ratio (LLGDP), Private Credit by Deposit Money in Banks to  GDP ratio (PCRDBGDP), 
Bank Deposits to GDP ratio (BDGDP), Current Account Balance to GDP ratio (CAGDP) 
and Bank Concentration (CONCENTRATION). Estimated results are presented in Table 
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Estimated results (see Table 2) show that workers’ remittance generally fosters 
economic growth. The financial development variable, depending on various proxies, 
may or may not play significant positive role on economic growth. However, the non-
linear effect of workers remittance is found to be positive and significant (except 
Concentration). Specifically, workers’ remittance along with financial development play 
positive and significant role in economic growth. Arellano – Bond test for second order 
auto-regression indicates that there is no serial auto-regression in the models considered 
in Table 2. Sargan test confirms the exogeneity of the instruments used in those models. 
The current account balance to GDP ratio (CAGDP) is found to be the most significant 
financial development indicator (among five indicators) in our standard growth 
regression (see Table 2). Moreover, this variable is available for most of the countries in 
our dataset. Since this variable, compared to other indicators of financial development, 
allows us to use the highest number of observations, we include it as the financial 
development variable in our further regressions.   
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Table 2: Testing Financial Development Indicator in economic growth regressions. 
 
  Pcrdbgdp Bdgdp Llgdp Cagdp Fdgdp 
 FE SGMM FE SGMM FE SGMM FE SGMM FE SGMM 
L1. GDP Growth 
Rate 
0.047 
(0.89) 
0.015 
(1.15) 
0.058 
(1.11) 
0.032** 
(2.03) 
0.057 
(1.07) 
0.038*** 
(4.44) 
0.046 
(0.90) 
0.015 
(0.83) 
0.060 
(1.14) 
0.022 
(1.16) 
Inv 4.19*** 
(4.63) 
2.74*** 
(5.39) 
4.11*** 
(4.53) 
3.39*** 
(6.51) 
4.09*** 
(4.52) 
3.10*** 
(7.27) 
4.01*** 
(4.61) 
3.00*** 
(5.32) 
4.09*** 
(4.53) 
2.49*** 
(4.18) 
Gov 0.871 
(1.24) 
0.696*** 
(4.75) 
0.972 
(1.16) 
0.656*** 
(5.38) 
0.956 
(1.14) 
0.535*** 
(2.92) 
0.940 
(1.15) 
0.676*** 
(4.57) 
0.944 
(1.13) 
0.427*** 
(3.88) 
Tec 0.036 
(1.79) 
0.037*** 
(3.25) 
0.045** 
(2.21) 
0.043*** 
(4.90) 
0.044** 
(2.16) 
0.058*** 
(5.27) 
0.043** 
(2.18) 
0.043*** 
(3.44) 
0.046** 
(2.27) 
0.080*** 
(4.67) 
FDI/GDP 0.159 
(0.94) 
0.143*** 
(5.60) 
0.151 
(0.89) 
0.107 
(0.23) 
0.149 
(0.88) 
0.089 
(1.06) 
0.188 
(1.19) 
0.092 
(1.24) 
0.140 
(0.82) 
0.060 
(0.68) 
Remittance/GDP 0.300 
(1.46) 
0.378*** 
(2.85) 
0.211 
(0.82) 
0.254 
(1.50) 
0.360 
(1.18) 
0.357* 
(1.66) 
0.103 
(0.98) 
0.036 
(0.16) 
0.239 
(0.92) 
0.107 
(0.03) 
Financial 
Development 
Indicators 
0.804 
(0.78) 
0.842 
(0.78) 
0.308 
(1.21) 
0.134*** 
(2.46) 
0.322 
(1.18) 
0.575* 
(1.79) 
0.148*** 
(2.43) 
0.099*** 
(4.69) 
0.564 
(1.49) 
0.872*** 
(2.39) 
Remittance_Financia
l Development 
Indicators 
0.601** 
(2.13) 
0.850*** 
(3.36) 
0.504 
(1.24) 
0.592*** 
(2.63) 
0.700 
(1.54) 
0.507* 
(1.67) 
0.037*** 
(2.91) 
0.023*** 
(3.66) 
0.534 
(1.34) 
0.317 
(0.96) 
Constant -4.534* 
(1.84) 
-2.203*** 
(5.35) 
-3.480* 
(1.77) 
-2.757*** 
(5.55) 
-3.889* 
(1.74) 
-1.041*** 
(2.77) 
-3.765* 
(1.86) 
-2.71*** 
(4.36) 
-3.330* 
(1.73) 
-1.937*** 
(2.80) 
Number of country 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Observation 332 327 332 327 331 326 342 337 332 327 
R
2
 0.36 - 0.32 - 0.31 - 0.41 - 0.32 - 
P-value AR(2) test - 0.26 - 0.29 - 0.33 - 0.34 - 0.31 
P-value Sargan test - 0.17 - 0.19 - 0.23 - 0.29 - 0.25 
 Note: t statistics is in parenthesis. ***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
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We then apply stepwise regression where we estimate Model 1 (see Table 3) 
without introducing trade openness, financial liberalization and financial development 
indicators. This helps us to compare the estimated results before and after introducing 
these variables. Model 2 introduces trade openness, Model 3 financial liberalization and 
Model 4 financial development indicators. Model 5 includes the cross products of 
remittance and trade openness; remittance and financial liberalization; and remittance and 
financial development.  
In a simple setup of economic growth model (see Table 3) we find that remittance 
plays a positive and significant role in economic growth. The study also finds that FDI, 
trade liberalization, financial liberalization and financial development positively affect 
the economic growth as well.   
The magnitude of the coefficients of FDI and remittance show that trade openness 
and financial liberalization increases the influence of FDI and remittance to contribute 
more in economic growth. Interestingly, without financial development, FDI plays a 
greater role (0.21** to 0.33**) than remittance (0.08** to 0.25**) in economic growth. 
However, when financial development takes place, remittance becomes a stronger 
determinant (0.25** to 0.31**) than FDI (0.13** to 0.20**) in economic growth 
(compare Model 1-3 with Model 4-5 in Table 3). Particularly, by comparing Model 1 
with Model 4 (in Table 3), we find that financial development catalyze the transmission 
channel from workers remittance to economic growth. If financial development variable 
is included into the empirical model (Model 4) the size and significance of 
Remittance/GDP increases. Moreover, the cross-product of remittance and financial 
development is found positive and significant, which indicate that if financial 
development is coupled with workers’ remittance, it accelerate economic growth. We 
also find that the cross-product of workers’ remittance and financial liberalization and the 
cross-product of workers remittance and trade openness positively affect economic 
growth.      
One year lag of economic growth, technological improvement in export sector 
and government investment, unsurprisingly, have positive impact on economic growth. 
The diagnostic test statistics confirms the stability of our estimated model. The Arellano 
– Bond (1991) test for auto-regression, AR (2) indicates that there is no presence of serial 
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correlation in estimated model. Sargan (1988) test results suggest that employed 
instruments are valid.  
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Table 3. Growth effect of workers’ remittance through financial development 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 FE SGMM FE SGMM FE SGMM FE SGMM FE SGMM 
L1.GDP Growth 
Rate 
0.10** 
(2.04) 
0.04*** 
(3.25) 
0.09* 
(1.95) 
0.08*** 
(7.25) 
0.09** 
(1.99) 
0.07*** 
(6.24) 
0.06 
(1.24) 
0.055*** 
(6.54) 
0.05 
(1.00) 
0.018 
(1.13) 
Inv 3.02*** 
(3.82) 
1.35*** 
(4.98) 
2.25*** 
(2.53) 
0.86*** 
(3.55) 
2.76*** 
(2.94) 
1.07*** 
(3.95) 
4.32*** 
(3.93) 
1.94*** 
(5.81) 
4.61*** 
(4.20) 
1.59*** 
(5.80) 
Gov 0.09 
(0.13) 
0.25*** 
(5.78) 
0.83 
(0.98) 
0.215*** 
(3.43) 
0.45 
(1.58) 
0.25*** 
(4.17) 
0.54 
(0.45) 
0.75** 
(12.25) 
0.115 
(0.10) 
0.98*** 
(8.50) 
Tec 0.05*** 
(3.05) 
0.03*** 
(3.62) 
0.04*** 
(2.37) 
0.01 
(1.01) 
0.06*** 
(2.88) 
0.01 
(0.47) 
0.06*** 
(2.51) 
0.07*** 
(5.38) 
0.06*** 
(2.61) 
0.035* 
(2.56) 
FDI/GDP 0.33*** 
(2.41) 
0.29** 
(2.16) 
0.25* 
(1.80) 
0.205*** 
(10.69) 
0.20 
(1.39) 
0.28*** 
(10.80) 
0.10 
(0.62) 
0.13*** 
(2.94) 
0.14 
(0.84) 
0.20*** 
(3.82) 
Remittance/GDP  0.09 
(1.12) 
0.08*** 
(4.18) 
0.06 
(0.69) 
0.18*** 
(2.98) 
0.06 
(0.77) 
0.255*** 
(3.09) 
0.08 
(0.70) 
0.31*** 
(6.95) 
0.065 
(0.50) 
0.245*** 
(3.45) 
Openness (OPEN) - - 1.73* 
(1.84) 
1.15*** 
(4.48) 
1.12 
(1.12) 
1.185*** 
(4.40) 
0.09 
(0.08) 
1.04*** 
(4.23) 
0.82 
(0.67) 
1.66** 
(2.57) 
Financial 
Liberalization (FL) 
- - - - 1.23* 
(1.69) 
0.53 
(1.46) 
1.93** 
(1.96) 
0.72*** 
(2.64) 
2.01* 
(1.76) 
1.01*** 
(3.37) 
Financial 
Development (FD)

  
- - - - - - 0.001 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(4.59) 
0.10 
(1.48) 
0.11*** 
(5.65) 
Remit*FD - - - - - - - - 0.03** 
(2.02) 
0.04*** 
(3.38) 
Remit*FL - - - - - - - - 0.19 
(0.55) 
0.32*** 
(3.10) 
Remit*OPEN - - - - - - - - 0.18 
(0.73) 
0.584*** 
(3.11) 
Constant -5.53 
(0.93) 
-3.74*** 
(7.72) 
4.92 
(0.25) 
-4.26*** 
(6.50) 
2.88 
(0.98) 
-6.98*** 
(6.14) 
0.46 
(0.02) 
-2.73*** 
(13.16) 
-9.43 
(0.32) 
-2.27*** 
(5.99) 
Number of country 56 56 56 56 56 56 54 54 54 54 
Observation 422 422 422 422 422 422 342 342 342 342 
R
2
 0.22 - 0.23 - 0.23 - 0.24 - 0.36 - 
AR(2) test (P-value) - (0.29) - (0.35) - (0.33) - (0.34) - (0.26) 
Sargan test (P-value) - (0.18) - (0.23) - (0.26) - (0.27) - (0.31) 
         Note: t statistics is in parenthesis. ***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 

CAGDP is used as FD. FE stands for the fixed effects.
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Now, if we go back to our empirical equation (1), we confirm that EG/WR =  + 
 (FD) > . This is because empirically both  and  are positive and significant. We also 
find evidence of EG/WR =  +  (FL) >  and EG/WR =  +  (OEPN) > . These are 
because both  and ; and both  and  are found to be positive and significant in the 
regression (see Table 3). Thus our hypothesis that in the presence of financial 
development, workers’ remittance significantly accelerates economic growth is supported 
by panel data.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The study examines whether financial development catalyses the transmission 
channel from workers’ remittance to economic growth. We apply five different financial 
development indicators, which are suggested by existing literature. After examining all 
indicators in growth regression, we select the most significant financial development 
indicator to further examine the non-linear effect of workers’ remittance on economic 
growth. The fixed effects and system GMM estimation techniques are used in unbalanced 
panel data. Our analysis indicates that methods matter in studying the effect of workers’ 
remittance and financial development on growth. Estimates based on system GMM 
indicate that the current account balance to GDP ratio is the most significant financial 
development indicator for economic growth. Both foreign capitals, FDI and workers’ 
remittance play significant role in economic growth; while the role of FDI is higher than 
that of workers remittance. However, in a financially developed economy, workers 
remittance play slightly higher role in economic growth than FDI does. Also, workers’ 
remittance plays a greater role in economic growth, if the country is financially 
developed than if it is not. Although this result contrasts with the findings of Giuliano and 
Ruiz-Arranz (2009), it is in the line of the conclusion of Ahamada and Coulibaly (2011). 
Financial liberalization and trade openness also positively affect economic growth. In the 
presence of financial liberalization and trade openness, workers remittance plays a greater 
role in economic growth.  
 
 18 
Reference 
 
Ahamada, Ibrahim and Coulibaly, Dramane (2011), How does financial 
development influence the impact of remittances on growth volatility?, Economic 
Modelling Vol. 28, pp. 2748–2760. 
Acosta, P.A., Baerg, N.R., and Mandelman, F.S. (2009), Financial Development, 
Remittances, and Real Exchange Rate Appreciation, Economic Review, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, Vol. 94, No. 1. 
Aggarwal, R., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Peria, M.S.M. (2006), Do Workers’ 
Remittances Promote Financial Development?, The World Bank, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3957. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and Pozo, S. (2004), Workers' Remittances and the Real 
Exchange Rate: A Paradox of Gifts, World Development, Vol. 32, pp. 1407-1417. 
 Arellano, Manuel and Bond, Stephen (1991), Some Tests of Specification for 
Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations, Review 
of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, No. 2 pp. 277-297. 
Barajas, A., Chami, R., Fullenkamp, C., Gapen, M., and Montiel, P. (2009), Do 
Workers’ Remittances Promote Economic Growth?, IMF Working Paper, (WP/09/153). 
Beck, Thorsten; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Levine, Ross (2009), Financial 
Institutions and Markets across Countries and over Time – Data and Analysis, Policy 
Research Working Paper 4943, The World Bank. 
Bekaert, Geert; Harvey, Campbell R., and Lundblad, Christian (2005) Does 
financial liberalization spur growth?, Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 77, pp. 3–55. 
Catrinescu, N., Leon-Ledesma, M., Piracha, M., Quillin, B., (2006), Remittances, 
Institutions and Economic Growth, Institute for the study of labor (IZA Discussion Paper 
2139). 
Chami, R., Fullenkamp, C. and Jahjah, S., (2005), Are Immigrant Remittance 
Flows a Source of Capital for Development?, IMF Staff Papers; Vol. 52, Number 1. 
Chowdhury, Mamta B. and Rabbi, Fazle (2014), Workers’ remittances and Dutch 
Disease in Bangladesh, Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Vol. 23 
(4), pp. 455-475.  
 19 
Giuliano, Paola and Ruiz-Arranz, Marta (2005), Remittances, Financial 
Development, and Growth, IMF Working Paper (WP/05/234). 
Giuliano, Paola and Ruiz-Arranz, Marta (2009), Remittances, Financial 
Development, and Growth, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 90, Issue 1, 144-
152 
Glytsos, N.P. (2002), The Role of Migrant Remittances in Developemnt: 
Evidence from Mediterranean Countries, International Migration, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 1-
25. 
Jackman, M., Craigwell, R., and Moore, W., (2009), Economic volatility and 
remittances: evidence from SIDS, Journal of Economic Studies, Vol 36, No. 2, pp. 135-
146. 
León-Ledesma, M., and Piracha, M., (2004), International Migration and the Role 
of Remittances in Eastern Europe, International Migration. Vol. 42, issue 4, pp. 65-82. 
Lopez, H., Molina, L., and Bussolo, M. (2007), Remittances and the real 
exchange rate, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4213. 
Lueth, E. and Ruiz-Arranz, M. (2008), Determinants of Bilateral Remittance 
Flows, The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Volume 8, Issue 1, Article 26. 
Prasad, E., R. G. Rajan and A. Subramanian, (2006), Patterns of international 
capital flows and their implications for economic development, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City Proceedings, 119-158. 
Rao B. Bhaskara and Hassan G. Mainul (2011), A panel data analysis of the growth 
effects of remittances, Economic Modelling vol. 28 pp. 701-709. 
Russell, S.S. (1986), Remittances from international migration: a review in 
Perspective, World Development, Vol 14, No. 6, pp. 677-696. 
Sargan, J. D. (1988), "Testing for Misspecification after Estimating Using 
Instrumental Variables", in Maasoumi, E. (ed.), Contributions to Econometrics: John 
Denis Sargan, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
 
  
 20 
APPENDICES 
 
ANNEX 1: Data sources 
Data/variable Data Source Data Period 
Remittance/GDP 
 
World Development Indicators Database 
 
1980-2009 
 
FDI/GDP 
 
World Development Indicators Database 
 
1980-2009 
 
GDP growth rate 
 
World Development Indicators Database 
 
1980-2009 
 
Tec 
 
World Development Indicators Database 
 
1980-2009 
 
Gov 
 
World Development Indicators Database 
 
1980-2009 
 
Openness Penn World Table(PWT) 1980-2008 
Gov Penn World Table(PWT) 1980-2008 
Financial Development Indicators Beck, Démirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) 1989-2008 
Financial Liberalization 
 
Bekaert et al. (2005) and authors own 
arrangement 
1980-2009 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2: Code and list of variables 
Variable Code 
LIQUID LIABILITIES / GDP LLGDP 
PRIVATE CREDIT BY DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS / GDP PCRDBGDP 
BANK DEPOSITS / GDP BDGDP 
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE/ GDP CAGDP 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM DEPOSITS / GDP FDGDP 
High-tech exports / Manufactured goods exports Tec 
Openness at 2005 constant prices (%) Openness 
Sum of government collective and government individual consumption 
expenditure 
Gov 
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ANNEX 3: List of countries in overall sample  
Algeria Fiji Jordan Philippines 
Argentina Finland Kenya Portugal 
Australia France Madagascar Republic of Korea 
Austria Gambia Malawi Sierra Leone 
Bangladesh Germany Malaysia Singapore 
Barbados Ghana Mali South Africa 
Brazil Greece Mauritius Spain 
Cameroon Guatemala Mexico Sri Lanka 
Canada Haiti Morocco Sweden 
Chile Honduras Nepal Switzerland 
Colombia India Netherlands Thailand 
Costa Rica Indonesia New Zealand 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Cote d'Ivoire Iran  Nicaragua Tunisia 
Denmark Ireland Niger Turkey 
Dominican Republic Israel Nigeria United Kingdom 
Ecuador Italy Norway United States 
Egypt Jamaica Pakistan Venezuela 
El Salvador Japan Paraguay Zambia 
Note: Number of countries is not common in each model (Table 3) due to the 
unavailability of data for the variables in each empirical model. However, ANNEX 3 
includes the list of all countries that are used in our sample.   
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ANNEX 4: Financial Liberalization 
Country 
Year of 
Liberalization 
Country 
Year of 
Liberalization 
Algeria 2000 Jordan 1995 
Argentina 1989 Kenya 1995 
Australia 1900 Madagascar 2000 
Austria 1900 Malawi 2000 
Bangladesh 1991 Malaysia 1988 
Barbados 1900 Mali 2000 
Brazil 1991 Mauritius 1994 
Cameroon 2000 Mexico 1989 
Canada 1900 Morocco 1988 
Chile 1992 Nepal 2000 
Colombia 1991 Netherlands 1900 
Costa Rica 2000 New Zealand 1987 
Cote d'Ivoire 1995 Nicaragua 2000 
Denmark 1900 Niger 2000 
Dominican Republic 2000 Nigeria 1995 
Ecuador 1994 Norway 1900 
Egypt 1992 Pakistan 1991 
El Salvador 2000 Paraguay 2000 
Fiji 2000 Philippines 1991 
Finland 1900 Portugal 1986 
France 1900 Republic of Korea 1992 
Gambia 2000 Sierra Leone 2000 
Germany 1900 Singapore 1900 
Ghana 1993 South Africa 1996 
Greece 1987 Spain 1985 
Guatemala 2000 Sri Lanka 1991 
Haiti 2000 Sweden 1900 
Honduras 2000 Switzerland 1900 
India 1992 Thailand 1987 
Indonesia 1989 Trinidad and Tobago 1997 
Iran  2000 Tunisia 1995 
Ireland 1900 Turkey 1989 
Israel 1993 United Kingdom 1900 
Italy 1900 United States 1900 
Jamaica 1991 Venezuela 1990 
Japan 1983 Zambia 2000 
 
 
 
